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CASE NOTES
Public Contracts—Small Business Act of 1958—Constitutional Law
—Denial of Due Process of Law and Equal Protection in Placement
of Government Contracts with Firms Owned by "Disadvantaged
Persons" Pursuant to Section 8( a ) of the Small Business Act of
1958—Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe.1 —At the request
of the Small Business Administration (SBA), prime contracts for the
hauling and disposal of refuse from Homestead Air Force Base,
Florida, were set aside by the Air Force in 1968 and 1969 2 in order
that the work be placed with small business concerns.8 These contracts
were subsequently awarded by the Air Force after formal advertising
and competitive bidding restricted to small businesses. The SBA and
the Air Force then arranged for the placement of the 1970 Homestead
refuse-disposal contract by a different method. Pursuant to regulations
ostensibly promulgated under the authority of Section 8(a) of the
Small Business Act,' the prime contract for 1970 was placed directly
1 334 F. Supp. 194 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
2 Small business "set-aside" contracts are authorized by § 2(8)(b)(11) of the Small
Business Act of 1958, which gives the SBA the power
to make studies and recommendations to the appropriate Federal agencies to
insure that a fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts for property
and services for the Government be placed with small-business enterprises, to
insure that a fair proportion of Government contracts for research and develop-
ment be placed with small-business concerns, to insure that a fair proportion of
the total sales of Government property be made to small-business concerns, and
to insure a fair and equitable share of materials, supplies, and equipment to
small-business concerns.. .
15 U.S.C.	 637(b)(11) (1970). In 1968 the successful bidder on the Homestead set-
aside contract for refuse hauling and disposal was the South Florida Sanitation Co. of
Dade County, which received the contract at a price of $42,245. In 1969 the successful
bidder was the Lila Waste Service, which received the contract at a price of $49,116.
334 F. Supp. at 197.
3 Section 2 of the Small Business Act contains the following definition of a "small-
business" concern:
For the purposes of this chapter, a small-business concern shall be deemed
to be one which is independently owned and operated and which is not dominant
in its field of operation. In addition to the foregoing criteria the Administrator,
in making a detailed definition, may use these criteria, among others: number
of employees and dollar volume of business. Where the number of employees
is used as one of the criteria in making such definition for any of the purposes
of this chapter, the maximum number of employees which a small-business
concern. may have under the definition shall vary from industry to industry
to the extent necessary to reflect differing characteristics of such industries and to
take proper account of other relevant factors.
15 U.S.C. 632 (1970).
4 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (1970) provides as follows:
It shall be the duty of the Small Business Administration, and it is em-
powered, whenever it determines such action is necessary—
(1) to enter into contracts with the United States Government and any
department, agency, or officer thereof having procurement powers obligat-
ing the Administration to furnish articles, equipment, supplies, or materials
to the Government. In any case in which the Administration certifies to any
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with the SBA. The SBA in turn subcontracted the work, without ad-
vertising or competitive bidding, to All American Waste, Inc., a black-
owned firm which had been organized with financial and managerial
assistance from the SBA.5 The 1971 Homestead refuse disposal con-
tract was again placed with the SBA pursuant to this new procedure.
When three small non-minority refuse-disposal firms were informed
that the SBA was again planning to award the subcontract to All
American, they demanded an opportunity to compete for the job.°
This demand was rejected by the SBA, and the 1971 Homestead sub-
contract was awarded to All American.
Shortly thereafter, the non-minority disposal firms brought suit in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
alleging that the SBA's new contracting procedure was without statu-
tory authority and that the plaintiffs' constitutional rights of due
process and equal protection had been violated. By order of the dis-
trict court, performance of the 1971 subcontract was held in abeyance,
and the prior subcontract was extended to October 25, 1971. Subse-
quently, on a motion for summary judgment, the district court HELD:
the program administered by the SBA under which subcontracts are
awarded on a non-competitive basis to firms owned by socially or
economically disadvantaged persons is without congressional author-
ization. Further, finding that the program utilizes race, color, and
ethnic origin as its primary criteria for eligibility, the court concluded
officer of the Government having procurement powers that the Administra-
tion is competent to perform any specific Government procurement contract
to be let by any such officer, such officer shall be authorized in his discre-
tion to let such procurement contract to the Administration upon such
terms and conditions as may be agreed upon between the Administration and
the procurement officer; and
(2) to arrange for the performance of such contracts by negotiating or
otherwise letting subcontracts to small-business concerns or others for the
manufacture, supply, or assembly of such articles, equipment, supplies, or
materials, or parts thereof, or servicing or processing in connection there-
with, or such management services as may be necessary to enable the Admin-
istration to perform such contracts.
The subcontracting program authorized under 	 2(8)(a) of the Small Business Act of
1958 will hereinafter be referred to as the 8(a) program inasmuch as the SBA regulations
and the court utilize this nomenclature.
6 The subcontract was awarded to All American for a price of $65,000, which was
arrived at by a computation of estimated cost plus allowance for a reasonable profit.
Shortly after its receipt of the Homestead subcontract, All American was able to underbid
a "non-minority" refuse-disposal firm on several of the Latter firm's largest commercial
accounts, causing it to lose an estimated 40% of its gross revenues. 334 F. Supp. at 197.
6 The complaining firms included South Florida Sanitation Co. and L&J Waste
Service, which had previously been successful in competing for the Homestead contract
under the "set-aside" procedure. They alleged that denial of the opportunity to bid
deprived them of between 45% and 85% of their gross annual revenues. Joining these
two firms was Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc., the firm which claimed to have lost its
major private contracts as a result of the action of the Air Force and the SBA. Named
as defendants in the suit were the Administrator of the SBA, the Secretary of the Air
Force, All American Waste and the contracting officer at Homestead Air Force Base.
149
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
that non-minority-owned firms are deprived of property without due
process and denied equal protection of the laws. Finding that the lan-
guage of section 8(a) does not release the SBA from the statutory
requirement that government contracts be competitively offered, the
court ordered that the Homestead subcontract be awarded on the
basis of the maximum competitive bidding practicable among small
business concerns.?
The Ray Baillie decision is significant in that it represents the
most successful challenge thus far made to the SBA's utilization of
its small-business subcontracting power—a power derived from Section
8(a) of the Small Business Ace—as part of the recently announced
effort by the federal government to encourage the development of
minority business enterprises. This note will examine the Ray Baillie
court's treatment of the SBA's small-business subcontracting power
and suggest possible additional sources of statutory authority for that
subcontracting program which were overlooked by the court. The note
will also examine the Ray Baillie decision in the light of present notions
of due process and equal protection.
Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act authorizes the SBA to
enter into procurement contracts with other government agencies and
to arrange for the performance of such contracts by placing subcon-
tracts with small business concerns.° The first regulations implementing
section 8(a) were promulgated in 1958." In 1970, a new set of imple-
menting regulations was published," differing from the original regula-
tions in two major respects. First, unlike the original regulations, the
1970 regulations" provided that subcontracts be awarded to small
business concerns on a regular basis without regard to the general
policy of Congress—expressed on more than one occasion—favoring
formal advertising with competitive bidding as the preferred method
to be employed by federal agencies in awarding contracts." The 1970
regulations also differed from the original regulations in that they
7
 334 F. Supp. at 202-03.
8 See Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, note 4 supra. In this casenote, the
terms "subcontracting power" and "small-business subcontracting power" will be used
interchangeably to refer to the power reposed in Section 8(a).
9 See note 4 supra.
10 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.8-1 at seq. (1958).
11 13 C.F.R.
	
124.8-1 at seq. (1972).
12 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.8-1, 124.8-2 (1972).
12
 Procurement of goods and services by military and civilian agencies of the federal
government is carried on by two methods: formal advertising and negotiation. When the
former method is used, the Government publishes general invitations for bids, and bids are
received according to a procedure prescribed in the Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act of 1949, 41 U.S.C. § 252 (1970). Contracts are awarded to the bidder whose
bid conforms to all of the requirements contained in the invitation to bid and is con-
sidered the most advantageous to the Government in terms of price, delivery and other
factors. Negotiation refers to methods of procurement other than by formal advertising,
including sole-source negotiation as well as informal competition among several firms
specifically invited to bid. Of the two methods, formal advertising is the one preferred by
Congress. 10 U.S.C. §§ 2302, 2304; 41 U.S.C. § 252 (1970).
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authorized the use of the 8(a) subcontracting authority exclusively
for the purpose of assisting small businesses owned by "disadvantaged
persons." 14 The court in Ray Bailie concluded that these 1970 innova-
tions in the 8(a) program had been promulgated by the SBA without
any congressional a.uthorization.' Further, the court noted that there
was nothing in the history of the small-business subcontracting power
or in the language of Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act which
revealed any intention on the part' of Congress either to create an
exception to the general requirement that government contracts be
competitively offered or to create a:program for the benefit of firms
owned by disadvantaged persons. 1°
In examining the court's conclusion that the 1970 innovations in
the 8(a) regulations were without statutory authorization, it will be
helpful to review briefly the history of the small-business subcontract-
ing power. Under the Defense Prodtiction Act Amendments of 1951,"
Congress entrusted the prototype of the small-business subcontracting
power to the Small Defense Plants Administration (SDPA). The SDPA
was authorized, under the Defense Production Act Amendments of
1951, to enter into contracts with other government agencies and to
subcontract to small business concerns "without regard to any other
provision of law," such as the ordinary requirements of formal adver-
tising and competitive bidding, whenever such action would facilitate
the prosecution of the war in Korea." This procurement-assistance
power was originally created as an emergency measure to assure that
small businesses would not be bypassed in the rush to meet wartime
procurement needs; it was to be used only as a last resort, when other
efforts to include small businesses in wartime production had failed.
After the war, the power was to be retained for use in emergencies so
that, when necessary, competitive procedures could be bypassed to
insure small business participation in the Government's emergency
14 13 C.F.R. § 124.8-1 (1972).
16 334 F. Supp. at 202.
15
 Id.
17 Act of July 31, 1951, ch. 275, 65 Stat. 131.
15 Under the 1951 Defense Production Act amendments, the SDPA was expressly
authorized to contract with other federal agencies and subcontract to small businesses
"without regard to any provision of law except the regulations prescribed under Section
201 of the First War Powers Act, 1941, as amended." Act of July 31, 1951, ch. 275,
§ 110, 65 Stat. 140-41. Section 201 of the War Powers Act authorized contracting
"without regard to the provisions of law relating to the making, performance, amend-
ment or modification of contracts," Whenever such action would facilitate the prosecu-
tion of the war. Act of December 18, 1941, ch. 593, 55 Stat. 839. On February 2, 1951,
President Truman issued Exec. Order No. 10210, 16 Fed. Reg. 1049 {1951), by which he
authorized certain specified agencies, including the Department of Defense, to exercise the
contracting power granted by section 201, specifically providing that "[a]dvertising, com-
petitive bidding, and bid, payment, performance or other bonds or other forms of
security need not be required." Id. This order, like the Defense Production Act of 1950
and its amendments, came as a response to the critical situation of the Korean War and
authorized only temporary action.
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efforts." Then, in 1953, Congress passed the first Small Business Act,"
establishing the SBA as a peacetime successor to the SDPA. The 1953
Act transferred to the SBA many of the powers of the SDPA, including
the small-business subcontracting power. However, the Small Business
Act of 1953 contained no authorization, such as that contained in the
1951 Defense Production Act Amendments, to exercise the subcon-
tracting power "without regard to any other provision of law." 21
In 1958, Congress enacted the second Small Business Act" and
included therein the present section 8(a), explicitly authorizing sub-
contracting. The SBA then promulgated the first regulations governing
the 8(a) program. These regulations stated that the subcontracting
power was being reserved for activation only during periods of emer-
gency, and that any subcontracting undertaken under that power
would utilize publicized competition and standard procurement proce-
dures." The 1958 8(a) regulations remained in force until they were
superseded by the 1970 regulations. 24 The 1970 regulations, as noted
19
 334 F. Supp. at 199. See also Boskoff, The Small Business Administration and Its
Minority Subcontracting Program, ABA Section of Public Contract Law, 7 Public Con-
tract Newsletter: Federal, State and Local Government Contracts No. 2 at 11-12 (1972).
20
 Act of July 30, 1953, ch. 282, 67 Stat. 235.
21 The Ray &dine court considered the absence of this phrase from the 1953 Act to
be a fact of major significance, although it saw no similar significance in the Act's
direction to arrange for the performance of 8(a) contracts "by negotiating or otherwise
letting subcontracts." 334 F. Supp. at 202. See note 46 infra.
22 Prior to the passage of the 1958 Act, the SBA stated in its 1958 Report to
Congress that the subcontracting power had not been used and that there was no inten-
tion to use the power in the future. The report concluded with the recommendation that
the power be continued on a standby basis for use in emergencies only. 334 F. Supp. at
199. However, the House Committee on Small Business did not accept this approach.
See text at note 33 infra.
28 13 C.F.R. § 124.8-1 (1958) began by paraphrasing paragraph (1) of Section 8(a)
of the Small Business Act (see note 4 supra), but it made no mention of the provisions
of paragraph (2). It went on to state that "this prime contracting authority has been
placed on a standby basis and will be activated as required to protect the interests of
small business." It then continued as follows:
(b) Standard Government procurement contracts, forms and procedures
applicable to civilian agencies in effect at the time of such contracting will be
utilized by SBA in making prime contracts and subcontracts.
13 C.F.R. § 124.8-2 (1958) provided as follows:
(a) During periods of emergency determined by the Administrator to
warrant exercise by SBA of its prime contract authority, SBA will review pro-
curement plans and programs of other Government departments and agencies
to determine the contracts for property, equipment, supplies, or materials which
SBA should undertake to furnish to the Government through the exercise of its
prime contracting authority. Upon making such determination, SBA will make
the certification provided for in section 8(a) (1) of the Small Business Act and
will enter into a formal contract with the procuring agency. Thereafter, SBA
will widely publicize its requirements and fully utilize its facilities listing in
soliciting bids or proposals. Awards will then be made to the best qualified
supplier, price and other factors considered.
24 13 CF.R. § 124.8-2 (1972) provides as follows:
(a) Concerns may submit applications for consideration under this program
to SBA regional or district offices. Applications will include complete information
regarding the concern's qualifications and capabilities to perform a contract.
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above, differ from the original regulations in that they do not restrict
the use of subcontracting power to emergency use, and they do not
prescribe formal advertising as the sole method to be employed in
awarding subcontracts.
Furthermore, the 1970 regulations announce a new policy of the
SBA to employ the subcontracting authority "to assist small concerns
owned by disadvantaged persons to become self-sufficient, viable busi-
nesses capable of competing effectively in the marketplace."" Pursuant
to this new policy, the regulations provide that to be eligible for an
8(a) subcontract, a firm must be "owned or destined to be owned by
socially or economically disadvantaged persons." 2° The new regulations
further define the standards of eligibility by stating that "this category
[of disadvantaged persons] often includes, but is not restricted to,
Black Americans, American Indians, Spanish Americans, Oriental
Americans, Eskimos and Aleuts." 27
After tracing this statutory and regulatory development of the
SBA's small-business subcontracting power, the court in Ray Baillie
determined that Congress intended the power to be exercised in the
manner prescribed by the 1958 8(a) regulations, i.e., on a competitive
basis during emergencies for the benefit of small businesses as a class.
This finding was inescapable, the court concluded, for several reasons.
First, the court noted that Congress, "in reposing the 8(a) power in
the SBA restricted the power by removing from it the right to exercise
. . . [the subcontracting power] without regard to any other provision
of law!'" Further, the court reasoned, Congress did not intend the 8(a)
subcontracting power to be utilized for the benefit of "socially or
economically disadvantaged persons."" Since the 1970 regulations
differed significantly from the original regulations, which were thought
by the court to express the intent of Congress, the court concluded
that the 1970 innovations were unauthorized and therefore illegal."
It is submitted that the failure of the court to find any legal
authority for the 8(a) program as administered under the 1970 regu-
(b) SBA will review procurement programs of other Government depart-
ments and agencies and identify proposed procurements suitable for performance
by potential subcontractors.
(c) SBA will determine if a potential subcontractor is competent to per-
form a specific contract and will conduct appropriate negotiations with the
other agency or department for the proposed procurement contract. Upon the
request of the other agency or department, SBA will certify that the Administra-
tion is competent to perform the contract. Upon agreement as to terms, including
price, SBA and the agency will enter into a prime contract using forms and
provisions prescribed by statute and regulations applicable to the other Govern-
ment agency. Thereafter, SBA will enter into appropriate subcontracts with
the subcontractors for the performance of the prime contract.
26 13 C.F.R. $ 124.8-1(b) (1972).
28 13 C.F.R. § 124.8-1(c) (1972),
27 Id.
28 334 F. Supp. at 200.
20 Id. at 202.
80
 Id. at 200-01.
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lations is due primarily to the fact that the court's search for authority
was incomplete in several respects. Because the 1958 subcontracting
regulations were promulgated in virtual contemporaneity with the
passage of Section 8(a) as part of the 1958 Small Business Act, the
court too readily assumed that those original regulations accurately
reflected the intent of Congress. Furthermore, the court mistakenly
assumed that the Small Business Act is the sole source of the SBA's
authority, and that inquiry into the nature of the subcontracting
power as authorized by law should therefore end with the passage of
the 1958 Act and its implementing regulations. The court also failed
to consider the details of the government's general contracting policy
as they relate to the facts of this particular case. That this incomplete
treatment of the issue of statutory authorization led the court into
much unnecessary difficulty and, ultimately, to an erroneous decision
should be evident from the following analysis.
On the basis of the contemporaneity of the 1958 subcontracting
regulations with the enactment of Section 8(a), and the similarity of
the subcontracting program outlined in those regulations to the pro-
gram authorized by the first Small Business Act, the court determined
that the "emergency-use-only" approach of those original regulations
accurately reflected the intent of Congress.n However, the court ne-
glected to consider factors which could lead to the conclusion that
Congress did not intend to restrict the subcontracting power to use
only in emergencies. First of all, there is no such limitation in the
statute itself, which provides that the SBA can exercise its 8(a) powers
"whenever it determines such action is necessary." 82 Furthermore, the
"emergency-use-only" approach contained in the 1958 SBA regulations
appears to have been expressly rejected by Congress. The House Select
Committee on Small Business made the following statement in 1960
regarding employment of the 8(a) power:
It is the conclusion of the committee that the interpreta-
tion of this Section of the act by SBA is too narrow and
limited; that it was the intention of Congress that it would
be used whenever necessary to assure that small business
receives its fair share of Governmental procurement and not
just in "national emergency." The committee believes that
small business is not getting its fair share, and that there
could very well be instances wherein the assuming of prime
contracts by SBA for the purpose of letting subcontracts
would be feasible."
Hence the original 8(a) regulations, at least insofar as those regula-
tions provided that the small-business subcontracting power was avail-
31 Id. at 200.
82 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (1970).
83 H.R. Rep. No. 2235, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1960). A 1958 report that shows
the SBA's "narrow and limited" interpretation is mentioned in note 22 supra.
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able for use only in emergencies, do not appear to have reflected
accurately congressional intent regarding that power. Rather, it would
appear that the restriction of the 8(a) power to use in emergencies,
originally contained in the 1951 Defense Production Act Amendments,
was incorporated into the 1958 subcontracting regulations contrary to
the express will of Congress.
The court in Ray Baillie also failed to realize that the Small
Business Act, read in isolation, does not adequately reflect the full
congressional and executive design regarding the 8(a) subcontracting
authority. After tracing the legislative history of that power up to
the passage of the Small Business Act of 1958, the court made no
further inquiry as to other possible sources of authority for the sub-
contracting program as it is presently administered. As a result, the
Ray Baillie court failed to discern that much of the SBA's authority
to utilize the 8(a) subcontracting power on behalf of "socially" and
"economically" disadvantaged persons is conferred by other statutes
and by executive orders promulgated since 1958.
One major post-1958 source of SBA authority is Title IV of the
Economic Opportunity Act, 34 which has as one of its purposes "to
assist in the ... strengthening of small business concerns and improve
the managerial skills employed in such enterprises, with special atten-
tion to small business concerns . . . owned by low income individuals
• • •186 Pursuant to this purpose, Title IV directs the SBA to provide
technical and financial assistance to eligible firms and specifically
requires that:
The Administrator of the Small Business Administration
shall take such steps as may be necessary and appropriate,
in coordination and cooperation with the heads of other
Federal departments and agencies, so that contracts, sub-
contracts, and deposits made by the Federal Government or
in connection with programs aided with Federal funds are
placed in such a way as to further the purposes of this
[title]. . . ."
This section, it is submitted, clearly provides express authorization for
the SBA to conduct a program, such as 8(a), which places government
" 42 U.S.C. § 2901-07 (1970).
85 42 U.S.C. § 2901 (1970).
83 42 U.S.C. § 2906c (1970). The court in Ray Baillie attached great significance to
the definition of "financial assistance" contained in Section 609 of the Economic Oppor-
tunity Act, which includes within the meaning of that term "assistance advanced by grant,
agreement, or contract, but . „ not . . • the procurement of plant or equipment, or
goods or services. . . ." 42 U.S.C. 2949 (1970). This section was interpreted by the
court as prohibiting the award of procurement contracts as part of the SBA's program of
financial assistance. 334 F. Supp. at 201. However, in light of the express provision of 42
U.S.C. § 2906c, it appears that section 609 was intended not to prohibit the award of
procurement contracts, but merely to prohibit administrators from giving away Govern-.
ment property as part of any program of financial assistance.
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contracts with those firms that Title IV is designed to benefit, e.g.,
small business concerns owned by "low-income individuals." Congress
appears to have been concerned that the term "low-income individ-
uals" would be inadequate to describe the owners of firms eligible for
contract assistance under Title IV, for they authorized the Adminis-
trator of the SBA "to define the meaning of low income as it applies
to owners of small business concerns eligible to be assisted under
this [title]. . ." 87
The SBA was not without guidance as to the factors it was to
consider in creating a definition of "low-income" pursuant to Title IV.
There were some indications that at least part of the Title IV program
should be directed toward members of disadvantaged racial minorities.
The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, in its Report on
the 1967 Amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act, urged adop-
tion of the present Title IV in the following words: "The Committee
feels that an important priority of the anti-poverty effort must be to
expand the opportunities for a stake in community economic life for
low-income persons and minority group members, especially in the
urban ghettoes."" The SBA was given further guidance and direction
in its efforts to define low-income as it relates to eligibility for Title IV
benefits by two executive orders which were issued between the enact-
ment of the present Title IV and the promulgation of the present 8(a)
regulations." On March 5, 1969, President Nixon issued Executive
Order 11458, calling for the appropriate departments and agencies of
the federal government to develop and coordinate a national program
for minority business enterprise.'° Thereafter, on March 2, 1970, the
President issued Executive Order 11518, which provided for the in-
creased representation of the interests of small business within the
federal government and ordered the SBA "to particularly consider the
needs and interests of minority-owned small business concerns and of
members of minority groups seeking entry into the business com-
munity. ”41
Clearly, then, an important part of the SBA's subcontracting au-
thority is derived from sources—Title IV and the subsequent executive
orders—which came into being after the enactment of Section 8(a).
The SBA has apparently chosen to utilize the 8(a) subcontracting
program as a mechanism for implementing the mandates from these
sources. This choice is particularly appropriate in light of the goal of
87 42 U.S.C. § 2906 (1970).
38 S. Rep. No. 563, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1967) (emphasis supplied).
88
 Executive Orders have the force and effect of law. Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric
Co., .329 F.2d 3, 7 (3d Cir. 1964); Contractors Ass'n. v. Schultz, 311 F. Supp. 1002, 1009
(ED. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
40 34 Fed. Reg. 4937 (1969). The President's power to establish equal opportunity
programs was established in Farkas v. Texas Instrument Corp., 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967). Cf. Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric Corp., 329 F.2d 3,
7-8 (3d Cir. 1964).
41 35 Fed. Reg. 4939 (1970).
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Title IV to arrange for the placement of government contracts with
firms owned by low-income individuals. The use in the 1970 8(a) regu-
lations of social or economic disadvantage as the standard of eligibility
under the program appears to be pursuant to the authorization in Title
IV to further "define the meaning of low income."'" Finally, as will be
demonstrated below, utilization of ethnic terms as part of the auxiliary
standards of eligibility is an attempt to implement the mandate of
Executive Orders 11458 and 11518 to encourage the development of
minority business enterprises." Thus it appears that the new policy
announced in the 1970 8(a) regulations, by which the benefits of the
small-business subcontracting program are directed toward firms
owned by disadvantaged persons, is authorized by Congress and the
Executive, contrary to the finding of the Ray Baillie court.
In finding that the SBA, by promulgating its 1970 8(a) regula-
tions, had created an unauthorized exception to the congressional
policy favoring the use of formal advertising and competitive bidding
in the placement of government contracts," the court in Ray Baillie
appears to have assumed that this policy represents a strict statutory
requirement. However, the legislative preference for publicized compe-
tition is far from absolute. There is some authority to the effect that
this policy governs only prime contracts awarded directly to private
concerns, and does not apply to situations in which the SBA bolds a
prime contract and does its own subcontracting to small business con-
cerns under section 8(a). 45
 Moreover, section 8(a) on its face pro-
42 Approval by the Chief Executive of the standards of eligibility contained in the
1970 8(a) regulations is evidenced by a subsequent Executive Order. On October 14,
1971, Executive Order 11458 was superseded by Executive Order 11625, 36 Fed. Reg.
19967 (1971), which directed each federal department or agency to continue all current
efforts to foster and promote minority business enterprises. That order contained the
following definition of the class which its provisions were intended to benefit:
(a) "Minority business enterprise" means a business enterprise that is owned
or controlled by one or more socially or economically disadvantaged persons.
Such disadvantage may arise from cultural, racial, chronic economic circum-
stances or background or other similar cause. Such persons include, but are not
limited to, Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Spanish-speaking Americans, American
Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.
Id. at 19970.
98 The further definition created by the SBA in the 1970 regulations appears to be
well within the scope of authority traditionally committed to administrative agencies.
It has long been recognized that, in the establishment of a governmental program,
"Congress may declare its will and after fixing a primary standard, devolve upon ad-
ministrative officers the 'power to fill up the details' by prescribing administrative rules
and regulations." United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77 (1932).
44 334 F. Supp. at 202.
ts Judge
 Wyzanski of the District of Massachusetts has stated, in a case similar to
the Ray Baillie case in terms of the facts and issues presented, that the procurement
statutes "are wholly inapplicable to a contract made by the Department of Defense with
the SEA which has specific statutory authority to enter into this type of contract,"
Kleen-Rite Janitorial Services, Inc. v. Laird, No. 71-1968-W (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1971).
The challenge to 8(a) subcontracting in Kleen-Rite was made on constitutional grounds,
however, and the legal authority for the 1970 8(a) regulation was not directly questioned.
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claims an exception to the general requirement of formal advertising."
Not only does the section permit negotiation in the placement of sub-
contracts, but—by use of the words "or otherwise letting"—it gives
the SBA discretion in choosing the manner in which its subcontracts
are let.
From the above investigation it appears that the court in Ray
Baillie was led into error through its failure to inquire thoroughly into
the legal authority underlying the 1970 subcontracting regulations. The
court's willingness to accept automatically the "emergency-use-only"
approach of the first subcontracting regulations as expressive of the
intent of Congress prevented consideration of persuasive indications
that the SBA is authorized to let subcontracts whenever it determines
that such action is necessary. By limiting inquiry into the legislative
and administrative history of the subcontracting power, the court failed
to discover a portion of that history which was of particular relevance
to the case it was considering. By assuming that the congressional
preference for publicized competition in awarding contracts is absolute,
the Ray Baillie court permitted itself to remain ignorant of a relevant
exception to this preference. A thorough inquiry into the derivation of
the innovation in the 1970 8(a) subcontracting regulations must yield
the conclusion that the new regulations are fully authorized by law.
The Ray Baillie court found the placement of subcontracts under
the 1970 8(a) regulations invalid not only on the ground of a lack of
authority, but on constitutional grounds as well. The court determined
that the complaining "non-minority" firms had been denied their Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection of the laws by
the_ placement of the Homestead subcontracts with All American
pursuant to the 1970 8(a) regulations 4 7 The court further found that
the utilization of government lending and contracting powers to en-
hance All American's competitive advantage in the private commercial
field "violates plaintiffs' rights under the Fifth Amendment . . . in that
it serves to deprive them of their property without due process of
law.'"s These conclusions were stated summarily by the court without
40 The Small Business Act authorizes procurement by negotiation in Section 8(a)(2),
which provides that the SBA has the power and the duty "to arrange for the performance
[of its contracts with other government agencies] by negotiation or otherwise letting sub-
contracts to small business concerns." 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(2) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
See note 4 supra. The Ray Baillie court, which considered only section 8(a)(1), failed
to notice this provision. Each of the statutes cited by the Ray Baillie court as expressive
of the congressional preference for competition and formal advertising contains a long
list of exceptions. Among the exceptions listed in the Armed Services Procurement Act
of 1947, 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (1970), as well as in the Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act of 1949, 41 U.S.C. § 252(c) (15) (1970), is one to the effect that publicized
competition is not required where negotiation is "otherwise authorized by law." Several
examples of negotiation "otherwise authorized by law" are listed in the regulations
promulgated pursuant to the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act. Among
the examples listed in that regulation is "negotiation permitted by the Small Business
Act." 41 C.F.R. § 18-3.217-3 (1972).
47 334 F. Supp. at 202.
48 Id.
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citation of any judicial authority, and, it is submitted, resulted from a
misapplication of the doctrines of equal protection and due process.
In reaching the conclusion that the plaintiffs' right to equal pro-
tection had been denied, the court considered the text of the 1970 8(a)
regulations as well as the affidavits of the Chiefs of the Procurement
and Management Assistance Division. for SBA's regional offices in
Atlanta and Boston 4 4 The statements of both of these officials indicated
that 8(a) benefits had not been restricted to members of ethnic minor-
ities and that, while most of the 8(a) subcontracts had been awarded to
non-whites, a small number of Caucasians had in fact received sub-
contracts under the new program." On the basis of this evidence the
court found that "whites" were not eligible for 8(a) subcontracts ex-
cept on a token basis, and that the primary criteria for eligibility under
the 8(a) program as presently administered are race, color, or ethnic
origin. Finding "no evidence that the members of 'minority' groups
identified in the substitute 8(a) regulations have been discriminated
against in the formation and operation of small business concerns
by reason of race, color, or ethnic origin,"" the court determined that
the exclusion of whites from 8(a) benefits "represents invidious dis-
crimination against them.""
This charge of "reverse discrimination" levelled by the court
against the SBA is one which is being raised with increasing frequency
now that affirmative action" is being taken in the public and private
sectors to remedy the effects of past racial oppression." So far as Ray
49 In addition to the affidavit of John T. Scruggs, Atlanta Regional Director of
Procurement and Management Asssistance, the court considered the affidavit of Boston
official David C. Buell. BueIrs affidavit had originally been filed in the similar case of
Kleen-Rite Janitorial Services, Inc. v. Laird, No. 71-1968-W (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1971).
60 The affidavit of John T. Scruggs contained the following statement:
In determining whether one is socially -or economically disadvantaged,
reliance is not placed on a single factor but rather on a composite of all the
factors. In addition, the Regulations promulgated with respect to 8(a) con-
tracts apply equally to members of all races. Thus, a Caucasian may be found
to be socially or economically disadvantaged and thereby eligible for participa-
tion in this program. Moreover, within my jurisdiction the Agency has awarded
approximately 225 8(a) contracts. Of this number, 212 were awarded to Black
Americans, eight to Spanish-Americans, two to American Indians, and three
were awarded to Caucasians.
334 F. Supp. at 198.
51 Id, at 202.
52 Id.
55
 "Affirmative action," in the employment context, is
the policy of developing programs which shall provide in detail for specific steps
to guarantee equal employment opportunity keyed to the problems and needs
of members of minority groups, including when there are deficiencies, the de-
velopment of specific goals and timetables for the prompt achievement of full
and equal employment opportunity.
Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pa. v. Schultz, 311 F. Supp. 1002, 1009 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
QIN, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). See also Nash, Affirma-
tive Action Under Executive Order 11,246, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 225, 226 (1971).
54
 See Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pa. v. Schultz, 311 F. Supp. 1002 (ED. Pa.
1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971), where the court
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Baillie is concerned, however, it is difficult to reconcile a finding of
unconstitutional "reverse discrimination" with the facts of the case
or with present notions of equal protection.
The court found that the racial neutrality of the term "socially or
economically disadvantaged persons" in the description of persons
eligible for 8(a) subcontracts under the 1970 regulations was of little
significance. According to the court, the primary criterion for eligibility
under the new 8(a) regulations is racial, and therefore unconstitution-
ally discriminatory against white firms. In several respects, the facts of
the case could lead to a contrary conclusion. A careful reading of the
new regulations reveals that the "racial" or "ethnic" terms used repre-
sent auxiliary guidelines to aid in determining the identity of those
persons who satisfy the primary, racially neutral criterion of being
"socially or economically disadvantaged." As Judge Wyzanski of the
District of Massachusetts has said in commenting upon the new 8(a)
program, "social and economic classifications are common in welfare
and other legislation, and have . . . not been regarded as unconstitu-
tional on that ground." 55 That the primary criteria for eligibility
under the new regulations are social and economic rather than "racial"
is indicated by the statements, in the new regulations as well as in the
affidavits before the court,'" that eligibility is not limited to the "racial"
groups described. The suggestion of SBA "tokenism" toward white
firms" is largely dispelled when the proportion of contracts awarded
through the 8(a) program is compared with the overall volume of
contracts placed with SBA assistance. In this larger view of SBA con-
was faced with the constitutionality of the Philadelphia Plan. The Philadelphia Plan
required bidders on federal or federally assisted construction contracts that exceeded
$500,000 to "take 'affirmative action to insure that applicants are employed ... without
regard to their race, color, religion, sex or national origin'" 311 F. Supp. at 1005
(quoting Exec. Order No. 11,246, I) 202(1), 3 C.F.R. 418, 419 (1972)). Plaintiffs argued
that the Plan violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 1 2000e et
seq. (1970), in that the contractors would be required to "hire and employ on the basis
of and with regard to race, color and national origin" because the Plan "imposes racial
'quotas'; . requires 'preferential' treatment for minority persons and so creates reverse
discrimination or in the ordinary context, the contractors, in order to meet his goals
would necessarily have to discriminate against white persons in order to hire minority
applicants." 311 F. Supp. at 1008. The court, however, rejected these contentions, and
concluded the Plan was not in conflict with Title VII. In reaching this conclusion, the
court noted that the Plan did not require that a certain percentage of minority indi-
viduals be hired, but only that a contractor make a good faith effort to meet the
required goals of the Plan. Moreover, the court reasoned that the Plan would be one of
"inclusion rather than exclusion" and that the "strength of any society is determined
by its ability to open doors and make its economic opportunities available to all who
can qualify." Id. at 1010. See Comment, Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 13
B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1347, 1368 (1972). See also Significant Developments, Legal
Education—Preferential Admissions: A Constitutional Challenge, 52 B.U. L. Rev. 304
(1972).
55
 Kleen-Rite Janitorial Services, Inc. v. Laird, No. 71-1968-W (D. Mass. Sept. 21,
1971).
50 See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
57 334 F. Supp. at 202.
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tract assistance, aid to firms owned by "disadvantaged persons" is pro-
portionately insignificant; by far the greater portion of SBA-assisted
contracts goes to firms owned by non-disadvantaged persons."
Implicit in the court's finding that the 8(a) eligibility guidelines
were unconstitutionally discriminatory is the assumption that all racial
classifications are unconstitutional per se. However, this assumption
is not consistent with present notions of equal protection. This is not
to say that racial classifications are not constitutionally suspect, and
not subject to strict scrutiny." Any agency which erects a classifica-
tion on the basis of race has the burden of establishing its validity by
showing that the classification is not "invidious," that the classification
is related to a compelling governmental interest, and that the classifica-
tion is a rational means of implementing that interest."
It is submitted that such a burden is met by the SBA in justifying
the use of racial terms in its 1970 8(a) regulations. The distinctive
feature of section 8(a) is the fact that it dispenses with the require-
ment of competition and thus provides the most appropriate medium
for extending contracts to firms which might otherwise be unable to
compete. Unquestionably, there are groups of disadvantaged persons
within the larger class of small-business owners with an especially
acute need to participate in government contracts.°' These groups,
because of the effects of past discrimination, racial or otherwise, have
been excluded from the mainstream of economic life. 62 In all likelihood,
58 Of the total military and civilian contracts made available through the SBA in the
two and a half years preceding the Ray Baillie decision, the amount for which the 8(a)
program was responsible was only .28 percent of that total. The total dollar volume of all
government contracts placed through SBA programs during that period was $23,480,
707,000, while the 8(a) program took up only $65,171,560 of that total amount. From
Statistics of the Department of Defense and the General Services Administration cited in
the Government's Brief at 5, Kleen-Rite Janitorial Services, Inc. v. Laird, No. 71-1968-
W (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1971).
59 O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to
Higher Education, 80 Yale L.J. 699, 711 (1971); Developments in the Law—Equal
Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1091-1101 (1969). See also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 193-94 (1964), and Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535
(1941).
80
 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9
(1967).
61
 While the minorities mentioned in the substitute 8(a) regulations make up about
16% of the population of the United States, they account for only 3% of the 5,500,000
businesses in the United States. Stans, Report to the President on Minority Business
Enterprise (Washington, D.C., 1970).
62 The example of America's black minority is particularly illustrative. The City of
Newark, New Jersey, has approximately 400,000 people, of whom more than half are
black. Of the 12,172 licensed businesses in the city, a little more than 10% are black-
owned. In Los Angeles there are 600,000 black people. Of its 121,039 licensed businesses,
an "almost invisible fraction" is owned by black people, and these few black-owned
businesses are located principally in ghetto areas. Of the 800,000 residents of Washington,
D.C., 63% are black, but only 1,500 of the 11,755 businesses—or less than 13%—are
owned by black people. 1968 Annual Report of the Interracial Council for Business
Opportunity, cited in T. Cross, Black Capitalism: Strategy for Business in the Ghetto 60
(1969). Only seven of the 17,500 authorized automobile dealers in the United States are
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members of these groups would remain excluded absent affirmative
corrective measures such as the 8(a) program. Thus, far from being
"invidious," the racial classifications in the new 8(a) regulations are
remedial." Having as their purpose "to assist small concerns owned by
disadvantaged persons to become self-sufficient, viable businesses
capable of competing effectively in the marketplace,"" the classifica-
tions pursue the same governmental interests as those proclaimed in
Title IV of the Economic Opportunity Act and in Executive Orders
11458 and 11518. Given the nexus which exists between socio-economic
disadvantage and membership in the enumerated minority groups,"
the use of racial terminology as an aid in determining the identity of
"disadvantaged persons" is a rational means of implementing these
governmental interests. Therefore it appears that the auxiliary guide-
black. Although 108 of this country's more than 6,000 radio stations direct their programs
to black listeners, only eight radio stations in this country are black owned. Id.
6a Statutes and regulations create many classifications which do not deny equal
protection. It is only "invidious discrimination" which offends the Constitution. Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963). The Supreme Court has recognized that there are
situations in which race may be considered in forming a remedy for past inequities.
North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971); McDaniel v.
Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971). In Youngblood v. Board of Public Instruction, 430 F.2d
625 (5th Cir. 1970), the court noted that "at this point, and perhaps for a long time,
true nondiscrimination may be attained, paradoxically, only by taking color into con-
sideration ... ." Id. at 630.
In support of its conclusion, the court in Youngblood cited the following passage
from United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.
1966):
The Constitution is both color blind and color conscious. To avoid conflict with
the equal protection clause, a classification that denies a benefit, causes harm,
or. imposes a burden must not he based on race. In that sense, the Constitution
is color blind. But the Constitution is color conscious to prevent discrimination
being perpetrated and to undo the effects of past discrimination. The criterion
is the relevancy of color to a legitimate governmental purpose.
Id. at 876.
This proposition was elaborated upon in Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment
Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968), in which the court made the following observation:
What we have said may require classification by race. That is something
which the Constitution usually forbids, not because it is inevitably an imper-
missible classification, but because it is one which usually, to our national shame,
has been drawn for the purpose of maintaining racial inequality. Where it fs
drawn for the purpose of achieving equality it will be allowed, and to the extent
that it is necessary to avoid unequal treatment by race, it will be required.
Id. at 931-32.
64 13 C.F.R. § 214.8-1 (1972). See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
66 [T]he incidence of poverty is much higher among non-whites than among
whites. In 1967, 41 percent of the non-white population was poor, compared
with 12 percent of the white population. Non-whites thus constitute a far
larger share of the poverty population (31 percent) than of the American popula-
tion as a whole (12 percent). Moreover, the non-white proportion of the poverty
population has been increasing, slowly but steadily, since the first racial count
was made in 1959; it was 28 percent then, and 32 percent by 1967.
Building the American City: Report of the National Commission on Urban Problems to
the Congress and the President of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 45 (1969).
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lines for determining eligibility under the 1970 8(a) regulations repre-
sent a permissible classification on the basis of race, rather than an
example of "invidious discrimination," and that the plaintiffs in Ray
Baillie were not deprived of equal protection of the laws.
The final claim raised by the plaintiffs in Ray Baillie, and sus-
tained by the court, involved a question of due process. One of the
plaintiffs maintained that the loss of its right to bid for the Homestead
contract under the 1970 regulations, coupled with the non-competitive
placement of the Homestead subcontract with All American at a
premium price, unfairly enhanced the competitive position of the black
firm. In support of its claim of a shift in competitive advantage, this
firm further alleged that the receipt of the subcontract enabled All
American to submit low bids for the performance of private commer-
cial contracts causing the complaining firm to lose several of its regular
customers to All American." Accepting these allegations as true, the
court concluded that the SBA had deprived this plaintiff of property
without due process of law by utilization of government contracting
powers pursuant to the new 8(a) regulations."
This conclusion is difficult to reconcile with generally accepted
notions of due process. It has been recognized that the federal govern-
ment, when contracting for goods or services or otherwise disbursing
its moneys, acts with all the prerogatives of a similarly situated private
party, subject to the limitations of the Constitution." The government
has often utilized these broad prerogatives, which include the power
to set "the terms and conditions upon which its money allotments .. .
shall be disbursed"" and "to determine those with whom it will dear"
in furtherance of social or economic goals which go beyond the im-
mediate needs of the specific procurement or allotment transaction. 71
Beyond a reference to "competitive advantage," the court did not
indicate the exact manner in which the SBA deprived the plaintiff of its
property by awarding the Homestead subcontract pursuant to the
new 8(a) regulations. However, a concern's competitive advantage is
not a sufficient interest to be protected as "property" under the due
process clause," as courts have been unwilling to afford a general
00
 For a discussion of a similar claim of "displacement," see Significant Develop-
ments, Legal Education—Preferential Admissions: A Constitutional Challenge, 52 B.U. L.
Rev. 304 (1972).
47 334 F. Supp. at 201.
08
 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940).
69
 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34. (1968).
70 310 U.S. at 127.
71
 Use of this general power is illustrated by the adoption by the Department of
Labor of the Philadelphia Plan, a program designed to increase overall minority group
employment in certain construction industry trades. The validity of this program was
sustained in Contractors A.ss'n v. Schultz, 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 442
F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). See note 54 supra.
72
 Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 139 (1939). In this case
several power companies complained that the sale of electricity by the TVA was not
authorized by the constitutional mandate to improve navigation and control floods in
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right within our economic system to be free from competition." Thus,
if the only injury suffered by the complaining firm was a diminution
of its competitive advantage, such a claim was damnum absque in-
juria.74 It is submitted that the non-minority plaintiff in Ray Baillie
had no valid claim under the due process clause.
Conclusion
The foregoing analysis reveals several difficulties in the district
court's treatment of the issues before it in Ray Baillie. These diffi-
culties fall roughly into two categories. The first comprises problems
arising from an incomplete inquiry into the sources of authority for
the 8(a) program as it has been administered since 1970. The court's
conclusion that Congress intended the 8(a) power to be used only in
emergencies resulted from its erroneous assumption that the intent of
Congress was accurately expressed in the 1958 8(a) regulations. The
failure to discover the extensive legislative and executive authorization
for employment of the subcontracting power as an aid to low-income
individuals and members of minority groups resulted from the court's
failure to investigate sources of authority other than the 1958 regula-
tions. By failing to inquire into the details of government procurement
policy or into the full text of Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act,
the court left itself unadvised of the fact that Section 8(a) itself con-
tains an exception to the general requirement of formal advertising.
The second category of difficulty relates to the court's application
of the constitutional doctrines of equal protection and due process
to the facts of this case. Contrary to the court's finding, the primary
criteria for eligibility under the 1970 8(a) regulations are social and
the navigable waters of the nation, and that such continued sale in competition with
them deprived them of property without due process of law. In the course of deciding
that plaintiffs had asserted no interest sufficient to give them standing in the federal
courts, the Supreme Court indicated by way of dicta that the competitive position alleged
to have been injured was not a sufficient interest to merit protection as "property" under
the due process clause. Id.
Insofar as it held that one's competitive advantage is not a sufficient interest to
confer standing, the Supreme Court has modified its position since the Tennessee
Electric Power decision. In Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1971),
plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment invalidating a regulation of the Comptroller of
the Currency which permitted national banks to compete with them in the mutual fund
industry. The Supreme Court held in that case that plaintiffs had standing as competitors
if (1) they suffered injury in fact from the competition, (2) the challenged regulation
permitted competition which was arguably unauthorized by law, and (3) Congress had
not intended to proscribe judicial review of the challenged agency action.
In the Investment Company Institute case, the plaintiffs' claim was based solely upon
federal statutes regulating banks and securities. There was no reliance upon the Consti-
tution and no attempt to equate "life, liberty or property" with "injury in fact." Thus,
insofar as it held that one's competitive advantage is not "property" within the meaning
of the due process clause, the authority of the Tennessee Electric Power case is not
affected by the decision in Investment Company Institute.
78 See Note, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 1134 (1939).
74 306 U.S. at 137.
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economic, not ethnic or racial. It is submitted that the rule of "per se"
unconstitutionality is not applicable to the racially-cast eligibility
guidelines, inasmuch as these ethnic qualifications are merely auxiliary,
and constitute a reasonable means of pursuing a remedial purpose pro-
claimed in executive orders of the President. Furthermore, since the
operation of the 8 (a) program infringes upon no right claimed in this
case which the law is prepared to recognize, the contention that one
of the plaintiffs had been deprived of property without due process is
without merit. In using its procurement powers to further the purposes
proclaimed in the 1970 8(a) regulations, and to promote economic
integrations at the entrepreneurial level, the government has chosen a
valid and appropriate means of remedying the economic inequities
which for too long have been characteristic of American life.
CHARLES S. JOHNSON, III
Income Tax—Reallocation of Gross Income—Controlled Corpora-
tions—Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. 1 —Re-
spondent taxpayers, First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., and First Se-
curity Bank of Idaho, N.A. (the Banks), are national banks which were
wholly owned subsidiaries of First Security Corporation, a publicly
owned bank holding company. First Security Corporation (the Holding
Company) also controlled Ed. D. Smith & Sons (the Management
Company), Smith (the Insurance Agency) and, starting in 1954, an
insurance company, First Security Life Insurance Company of Texas
(Security Life).
In 1948, the Banks made arrangements to offer credit life insurance
to their borrowers.' Until 1954, the Banks referred all borrowers de-
ciding to purchase this insurance to two independent insurance car-
riers.' Federal banking laws prohibited the Banks from receiving sales
commissions or other income from the credit insurance generated by
1 405 U.S. 394 (1972).
2
 The Tax Court lists the reasons for the Banks providing this service:
. . . (1) to offer a service increasingly supplied by competing financial institu-
tions, (2) to obtain the benefits of the additional collateral which credit
insurance provides by repaying loans upon the death, Injury, or illness of the
borrower, and (3) to provide an additional source of income—part of the pre-
miums from the insurance—to Holding Company or its subsidiaries.
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Commissioner, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1321, 1322
(1967).
3 The Banks followed a certain routine in making this insurance available to their
customers. The lending officer would describe the purpose and availability of credit life
insurance. If the borrower wanted the coverage, the Banks would fill out the required
form, deliver a certificate to the customer, and collect the premium or add it to his loan.
The completed forms were then forwarded to the Management Company which main-
tained the insurance records, forwarded customer premiums to the independent insurer,
and processed claims filed under the policies. The Banks' costs in providing these services
were estimated at $2000. 405 U.S. at 396-97.
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